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ABSTRACT
This study examined the interest margin following the significant
drop in its contribution to credit institutions’ total income.
Balance sheet variables, income statement and annual report vari-
ables, and external variables were studied separately. Variables
that had not previously been studied in the literature were con-
sidered, and determinants that had already been studied were
revisited after the reduction in the interest margin. The diversifica-
tion of investment in associated companies and investment in
fixed and variable income are causes of this decrease in the inter-
est margin. Higher fees and commissions offset this decrease.
Greater size and market power have reduced the interest margin.
Regulations stipulated in the Basel III Accord regarding liquidity
may adversely affect the solvency ratio. Results were obtained
using econometric analysis of panel data. The analysis consisted
of four separate regressions: one for balance sheet variables, one
for income statement and annual report variables, one for exter-
nal factors and one for annual effects.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 4 June 2019








Following the demand-driven crash of 1929 and the supply-driven oil crisis of 1973,
the global economy has been profoundly shaken by a third major crisis, which origi-
nated in the financial sector (Rodrik, 2015). This crisis has cast doubt over the sus-
tainability of the financial system. The numerous causes include structural changes in
the revenue streams of credit institutions – more specifically, the sharp drop in the
interest margin associated with their intermediation activities. Figure 1 shows the evo-
lution of the interest margin of Spanish credit institutions from 1985 to 2015. The
interest margin with respect to assets fell from more than 4% to 1%, and the interest
margin with respect to gross income fell from 90% to 50%.
Intermediation is indispensable to market economies. The financial system is
responsible for channelling monetary flows from economies with surpluses to those
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with deficits. Therefore, one of the functions of the credit institutions is to attract
savers’ funds and then offer these funds to those seeking financing. Understandably,
the interest paid to savers in a market economy is lower than that charged to debtors.
This difference is known as the interest margin, and it provides one of credit institu-
tions’ main revenue streams.
The vast literature on the interest margin reflects its importance. In 1945, Samuelson
(1945) explained how an increase in the interest rate could affect the banking system.
In 1981, Ho and Saunders (1981) conducted the first study of the determinants of the
interest margin. Since then, countless studies of the interest margin have been per-
formed. In recent years, however, the major change in the contribution of the interest
margin to total revenue is likely to have changed the fundamentals regarding its deter-
minants. This change, the recent emergence of new variables, the scarcity of the litera-
ture and the importance of the interest margin to the financial system and the market
economy justify the need for further research in this area.
The aim of this article was to identify the current determinants of the interest
margin. The method used in this article built on the methodology applied in previous
studies whilst making two novel contributions to enrich the existing literature (Ho
and Saunders, 1981; Chortareas, Garza-Garcıa, and Girardone, 2012; Entrop et al.,
2015; along with H€annik€ainen, 2015); Islam and Nishiyama, 2016; Felıcio et al., 2018;
Seba and Jitendra, 2019; Cruz-Garcia, de Guevara, and Maudos, 2019; Franc-
Dąbrowska, Mądra-Sawicka, and Ulrichs, 2019).
First, four separate regression models were built, one comprising balance sheet var-
iables, one comprising income statement and annual report variables, one comprising
external factors and one including annual effects to assess the effect of the state of
the economy in each year. This approach showed the separate effects of these four
broad groups of variables on the interest margin whilst avoiding problems of multi-
collinearity between them. Second, seven new variables, never before included in
studies in this area, were considered to complete the set of variables that might affect
the interest margin. Most of these variables have only recently been adopted for use
by financial institutions.
Figure 1. Evolution of the interest margin of Spanish banks and lenders.
Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the Bank of Spain.
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This article advances the literature in three ways: by showing the determinants of
the interest margin following a major reduction in the interest margin, by including
seven new variables to enrich the set of variables that might influence the interest
margin, and by showing the effects of specific groups of variables separately from the
effects of other groups of variables. If variables from different groups, such as equity,
gross domestic product (G.D.P.), and fees and commissions, were considered in the
same regression, they would mutually influence one another, thereby altering the total
effect on the interest margin. For instance, we can reasonably expect a decrease in
G.D.P. not to have the same effect on a credit institution with a high level of equity
as on a credit institution with problems of solvency. By performing a separate regres-
sion for each of the four major areas of influence, the effects could be observed
independently.
The principal findings of the study include the following. Larger credit institutions
have smaller margins, so there are economies of scale. The increase in leverage with
wholesale funding increases the interest margin. An increase in fees and commissions
enables a reduction in interest margins. An increase in the rate of default decreases the
interest margin. An increase in the market power of credit institutions results in lower
interest margins. Commercial banks have higher interest margins than savings banks.
The importance of economic interest margin is given, besides the concepts already
commented in previous paragraphs, by its influence on the efficiency of the own
banks (Heti Suryani Fitri, Sri Mulyantini, & Jubaedah, 2019). Another sign of its
importance is highlighted by Seba and Jitendra (2019), by emphasising the import-
ance of the interest margin with respect to the adequacy of the commercial banks
capital and its relation with the interest margin. On the other hand, and continuing
with the importance of the latter in relation to the banks, Lin et al. (2019) assert that
the banking entities financially rescued have a higher interest margin. Furthermore, a
greater financial statements transparency is linked to specific reductions in interest
margins according to Birchwood, Brei, and Noel (2017). Following Cruz-Garcia et al.
(2019), the expansive measures undertaken by central banks have a negative impact
in the interest margin. Another important point about interest margins lies in its
impact on profitability, given that in the words of Birchwood et al. (2017), for each
year that interest margins are kept low, profitability decreases six basis points. In a
similar way, Saaskilahti (2018) states that these interest margins depend on the mar-
ket interests.
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature
review. Section 3 describes the model and the variables used in the model. Section 4
presents detailed analysis of the results and discusses their consequences. Section 5
shares the implications of the findings. Section 6 presents the conclusions of
the study.
2. Literature review
To adapt the literature review to the methodology adopted in this study, this section
provides the theoretical framework for the variables included in the study based on
the proposals of different authors. These variables are arranged into four groups.
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2.1. Balance sheet variables
2.1.1. Size
The literature offers two theories regarding the expected effect of size on interest
margin. According to Dietrich (2016), Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011), Ho and
Saunders (1981) and Poghosyan (2010), larger size leads to economies of scale and
therefore lower margins. According to Afanasieff, Lhacer, and Nakane (2002),
Demirg€uç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Hawtrey and Liang (2008), Maudos and
Fernandez de Guevara (2004) and Williams (2007), banks with more extensive branch
networks have higher production costs, which are reflected in a higher inter-
est margin.
2.1.2. Liquidity
Lin et al. (2012) proposed two theories. The first is that banks must increase their
margins to offset the interest they do not receive due to greater liquid assets. The
second is that, because liquid assets yield no return, greater fixed assets mean lower
interest revenue and a lower interest margin. This second theory is also supported by
Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011).
2.1.3. Equity
The ratio of equity to assets is traditionally used as a proxy for risk aversion.
According to Angbazo (1997), Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011), Ho and Saunders
(1981), Kasman et al. (2010), Lin et al. (2012), Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara
(2004), Maudos and Solıs (2009), Saunders and Schumacher (2000) and Williams
(2007), an increase in equity increases the average cost of funds for financing.
Therefore, credit institutions need a higher interest margin to offset the higher cost
of capital. Another theory, based on a different line of argument that nonetheless
leads in the same direction, has been expounded by Demirg€uç-Kunt, Laeven, and
Levine (2003), who affirmed that better capitalized banks have lower costs of financ-
ing and therefore greater margins. Zhou and Wong (2008) are amongst the few schol-
ars who have reported that an increase in equity decreases interest margins.
2.2. Income statement and annual report variables
2.2.1. Administrative expenses
According to Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux (2001), Fungacova and Poghosyan
(2011), Kasman et al. (2010), Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), credit insti-
tutions that have high operating costs tend to transfer these costs to customers
through an increase in interest margins. Therefore, interest margins are higher.
2.2.2. Rate of default
According to Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011), Kasman et al. (2010), Lin et al.
(2012) and Williams (2007), credit institutions with a high rate of default require a
high interest margin to offset the higher risk of non-payment.
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2.3. External variables
2.3.1. Market power
Like Chortareas et al. (2012), Dietrich (2016), Kasman et al. (2010), Nguyen (2012)
and Williams (2007), we used the Herfindahl–Hirschmann index (i.e., the sum of the
squares of the ratio of the total assets of each bank to the total assets of the sector).
All authors agree that greater market power means higher interest margins.
2.3.2. Harmonised index of consumer prices (H.I.C.P.)
The relationship between inflation and interest margin depends on whether inflation
is predicted or unforeseen. If inflation is predicted, the credit institution can adjust
its interest rates to match the forecasts. Some scholars such as Brock and Rojas
(2000), Claeys and Vennet (2008), Demirg€uç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Martınez
Peria and Mody (2004) and Trujillo-Ponce (2013) have reported a positive link
between inflation and profitability. However, if inflation is unforeseen, credit institu-
tions cannot adjust interest rates to inflation. There may therefore be a negative rela-
tionship between inflation and interest margin (Claeys & Vennet, 2008; Kasman
et al., 2010).
2.3.3. Interest rate
According to Williams (2007), a higher interest rate means a higher margin.
2.3.4. Gross domestic product (G.D.P.)
The economic cycle is thought to be closely linked to the profitability of credit insti-
tutions. In periods of expansion, profitability should increase, with the opposite
occurring in periods of recession. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient should be
positive (Claeys & Vennet, 2008; Drakos, 2002). However, other scholars (Carbo
Valverde & Rodrıguez Fernandez, 2007; Claeys & Vennet, 2008; Gelos, 2006; Kasman
et al., 2010; Martınez Peria & Mody, 2004) have argued that the interest margin is
countercyclical.
2.3.5. Ownership structure: savings banks (public) versus commercial
banks (private)
The sign of this variable cannot be predetermined. However, given the circumstances
in Spain regarding the recapitalisation of savings banks, the sign is expected to be
positive (Climent-Serrano, 2012).
3. Data and method
3.1. Sample
Most studies of the interest margin have focused on just one country, although some
have used multi-country samples. We focused solely on Spanish credit institutions.
This approach was suitable given the huge number and diversity of variables and the
major difficulties in performing multi-country studies. These difficulties include dif-
ferences in the structure and organisation of financial statements and financial
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systems, the variation in financial regulations, and the frequent regulatory changes
that take place at different times in different countries.
These difficulties are compounded by an operational hurdle in that the commercial
databases that are typically used in academic research have major limitations in terms
of their coverage of financial institutions. To justify our choice of sample without
casting aspersions over the quality of the database, BankScope covers just 47.56% of
credit institutions in Spain, 24.68% in the U.K., 11.41% in Portugal, 48.72% in
France, and 18.99% in Luxembourg (Foos, Norden, & Weber, 2010).
According to Beck and Demirg€uç-Kunt (2009) and Bhattacharya (2003), the study
of several countries with the aforementioned limitations leads to bias in the variables
associated with market structure. Furthermore, variations in the coverage of the data-
base over time may affect the results of any comparisons (Iba~nez-Hernandez, Pe~na-
Cerezo, & Araujo de la Mata, 2014). Therefore, in this type of study, it is crucial to
focus on a single country. Despite this single-country focus, the results are applicable
to all countries, after accounting for context-specific features, because the evolution
of the interest margin is similar in most developed countries.
To gather data on the credit institutions, we used the annual accounts and reports
of the 47 savings banks that existed in 2004, the 14 largest commercial banks and the
two largest credit cooperatives over the period 2004 to 2014. This sample covered
more than 97% of all assets in the Spanish financial system. All other data were
gathered from the Bank of Spain and the Spanish National Employment
Office (I.N.E.M.).
3.2. Method
Data were available for 21 to 76 credit institutions, depending on the year, across the
11 time periods (2004–2014) considered in this study. For example, in 2004, there
were 76 credit institutions, but by 2014, there were just 21. This data availability
meant that we were able to examine both the temporal and cross-sectional dimen-
sions of the sample through an econometric model of non-balanced panel data. This
approach provided a data set that was more informative than a cross-sectional data
set would have been. The data set used in this study had greater variability, less col-
linearity and more degrees of freedom than a cross-sectional data set. We were there-
fore able to estimate the econometric linear regression model more efficiently and
control for endogeneity and individual unobserved heterogeneity (Arellano &
Bonhomme, 2012).
We estimated four econometric models using panel data. We estimated the first
three fixed effects models using ordinary least squares after first performing the
Hausman test for homogeneity. Using a fixed effects model means that the resid-
uals are decomposed into two parts: a fixed part (xi) that is constant for each
individual and a random part (eit). This is equivalent to observing a general trend
using regression by assigning each individual with a different intercept on the
y-axis.
The values of the Durbin–Watson statistic for the three models indicate the poten-
tial existence of first-order autocorrelation of the residuals. The value of this statistic
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was approximately 1.5. Therefore, we estimated three models using the AR(1) system.
The variable AR(1) was significant, which indicated a certain degree of inertia of the
dependent variable. The fourth model was estimated using the generalised method of
moments (G.M.M.) described by Arellano and Bond (1991).
The fees and commissions variable was one of the variables that changed the
most. We therefore performed specific analysis of fees and commissions by fitting
a quadratic equation and conducting graphical analysis. The aim was to study
the trend.
Each of the variables included in the econometric models exerted an influence on
the rest of the variables considered in the regression. Thus, when heterogeneous vari-
ables such as G.D.P. variation, solvency and fees and commissions were included, the
model yielded a result in which the variation of one of these variables depended on
the others. However, it may be assumed that a decrease in G.D.P. would have a dif-
ferent effect depending on each credit institution’s solvency. We therefore built four
econometric models to estimate the effect of each variable within four separate
groups: balance sheet variables, income statement and annual report variables, exter-
nal variables and annual effects. The use of these groups avoided multicollinear-
ity problems.
As specified in the introduction, the two novel contributions of this study to the
literature on this topic are the study of different variables in four groups and the
inclusion of seven new variables. The theory that supports these contributions is
described below.
3.3. Model 1 (balance sheet variables)
The composition of the balance sheet explicitly determines the revenue of credit insti-
tutions. The composition of the balance sheet has changed substantially since Ho and
Saunders (1981) published their initial research, particularly in relation to Spanish
and European credit institutions that combine traditional commercial banking and
investment banking activities. Therefore, the results are expected to differ from those
for when the interest margin was virtually the only source of revenue.
Four new variables have been included in this model. These variables have a major
bearing on the structure of the balance sheet. However, we have not found any litera-
ture on these variables. These variables are described below.
3.3.1. Investment in associated companies and variable income
Increasing these investments reduces investment in loans. Because loans as a percent-
age of assets falls, so should the interest margin.
3.3.2. Investment in fixed income
Revenues from assets invested in fixed income are considered in the calculation of
the interest margin. Thus, the effect on the interest margin should depend on
whether the return from fixed income investments is greater than or less than the
return on loans.
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3.3.3. Financing through wholesale debt
This type of financing increases leverage. Investment increases, but deposits do not.
Therefore, the margin should also increase. Model 1, which includes the balance sheet
variables studied in the literature review and the new variables, is defined below:
Margen de interesbalance ¼ xi þ bit þ bit log activoþ bit Liquidez
þbit Empresas participadasþ bit Inversion en renta fija
þbit Inversion en renta vþ bit Financiacion mayorista
þbit Fondos propiosþ bit inerciaþ eit
3.4. Model 2 (income statement and annual report variables)
The way in which the balance sheet is managed is reflected by the results in the
income statement. We studied the results of the management (rather than the com-
position) of the balance sheet using the results shown in the income statement. The
modification of the structure of the balance sheet has changed the sources of revenue.
Moreover, it is increasingly common to receive payment for services rendered. This
situation is new, so fees and commissions increasingly represent a higher percentage
of revenue.
This model includes three new variables. Fees and commissions, return on capital
and associated companies. The first two variables have been included in some studies
as non-financial income, but a breakdown is not provided. To the best of our know-
ledge, no study has considered the third variable (i.e., risk-weighted assets).
3.4.1. Fees and commissions
One of the credit institutions’ responses to the decrease of the margin is the increase
of revenue through fees and commissions, so we should observe an inverse
relationship.
3.4.2. Return on Capital and associated companies
Greater investment in this type of asset means lower investment in loans. Therefore,
interest margin revenue should decrease.
3.4.3. Risk-weighted assets
This variable is the ratio that credit institutions use to calculate the resources they
need to cover the solvency ratio. The price of assets (i.e., the interest that credit insti-
tutions receive) is inversely related to risk. The most solvent assets have a lower
weighting and therefore lower interest and lower margin. Increasing quality decreases
the ratio and decreases the interest margin. There should be a direct relationship.
3.4.4. Rate of default
There is a discrepancy with the theories identified during the literature review. A dif-
ferent relationship is predicted. Credit institutions with higher rates of default are
expected to no longer receive interest from doubtful loans. Therefore, the interest
margin should be lower.
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3.4.5. Earnings before tax
The control variable of earnings before tax was also included. Higher margins should
mean greater earnings.
Model 2 (income statement and annual report variables) is defined as follows:
Margen de interesPyG ¼ xi þ bit þ bit Comisiones
þ bit Rendimientos de capital y participadas
þbit Gastos de administracion bit Morosidad
þbit Activos poderados por riesgo
þ bit BAT ROAþbit inerciaþ eit
3.5. Model 3 (external variables)
The economic and market situation undoubtedly affects credit institutions and there-
fore the interest margin.
3.5.1. Market power
The relationship described by other authors – namely, that greater market power
should mean a greater interest margin – would normally be the case. However, given
the nature of the process of mergers in Spain, the relationship may be different.
Mergers have taken place across regions. Thus, whilst market share might have
increased nationally, actual market power has not. This is because the geographical
coverage has increased, whilst the market share within the same region has not. This
has, however, brought economies of scale. Therefore, an increase in market power
might actually lead to a lower interest margin. To account for this effect, the regional
market power index must be calculated as it was by Cai, Xu, and Zeng (2016) for
Chinese credit institutions.
Model 3 (external variables) is defined as follows:
Margen de interesV: externas ¼ xi þ bit þ bit Herfindahl e Hirschman
þ bit IPCA þ bit Bono a 10 a~nosþ bit PIB nominal
þbit Estructura de propiedadþbit inerciaþ eit
3.6. Model 4 (annual effects)
To complete this study, we performed a regression based on events during the study
period. Two situations may have affected the interest margin: first, the financial crisis
of 2007 and 2008 and, second, the huge number of corporate transactions in 2010
together with the massive injection of public funds in 2011 and 2012. According to
Chen and Lin (2016), the injection of public funds entails a decrease in inter-
est margins.
The G.M.M. described by Arellano and Bond (1991) was used to determine the
annual effects. Period dummy variables with period fixed effects were included.
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Model 4 (annual effects) is defined as follows:
Margen de interesefectos anuales ¼ bit Margen t  1ð Þ þ bit 2006þ bit 2007
þ bit 2008þ bit 2009 þ bit 2010 þ bit 2011
þ bit 2012þ bit 2013 þ bit 2014it þeit
Table 1 summarises the variables, their structure, the expected effect and the
observed effect.
We first studied the seasonality of the series using the unit root test (Levin, Lin, &
Chu, 2002). A unit root was detected for two variables: fixed income and earnings
before tax. We solved this problem by taking the logarithm for the fixed income and
the first difference for earnings before tax. The unit roots were thereby eliminated.
The problems of autocorrelation of the dependent variable were removed using
AR(1) system estimation for the first three models and the G.M.M. for the fourth
model. Table 2 shows the values of the Durbin–Watson statistic, which confirmed the
absence of autocorrelation. The regressions were estimated using White’s model with
robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. Multicollinearity was tested
for by estimating the variance inflation factor (V.I.F.). As Table 3 shows, all values
were below 10, corroborating the absence of multicollinearity. Table 2 shows the
descriptive statistics for the variables.
4. Results
The results of the four estimated regressions appear in Table 4.
4.1. Balance sheet variables
We observed a certain degree of inertia in the interest margin (28.9%). The sign
for size was negative, implying that larger institutions had lower margins. We
verified Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011) economies of scale hypothesis.
Institutions with greater liquidity had lower interest margins. We confirmed the
theory proposed by Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011) and Lin et al. (2012) regard-
ing fixed assets.
Taking control through investment in associated companies also resulted in a
lower margin. The hypothesis proposed in this research was confirmed. Banks that
allocated a high percentage of their investment of assets to associated companies
invested less in loans to customers and therefore had lower margins. The same results
were observed for fixed and variable income. The hypotheses proposed in this article
regarding these two variables were also corroborated. As expected, an increase in
leverage through wholesale funding increased the interest margin. An increase in
equity (greater solvency) increased the margin. The theory proposed in the literature
review was corroborated.
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4.2. Income statement and annual report variables
Fees and commissions provide the main revenue stream used by credit institutions to
offset the drop in income due to the decrease in interest margins. Figure 2 shows fees
and commissions as a percentage of assets and a percentage of gross margin. The
graph of fees and commissions as a percentage of assets shows a decrease in fees and
commissions when the economy grew and an increase in fees and commissions when
the economy contracted. However, the most significant data related to fees and








Dependent variable Difference between interest received




Size Logarithm of assets þ/- –
Liquidity Liquidity as a percentage of total
assets (%)
þ/- –
Equity Equity as a percentage of total
assets (%)
þ þ
Associated companies Associated companies as a percentage
of total assets (%)
– –
Investment in fixed income Investment in fixed income as a
percentage of total assets (%)
þ/- –
Investment in variable income Investment in variable income as a
percentage of total assets (%)
–
Wholesale debt financing Wholesale debt financing as a
percentage of total assets (%)
þ þ
Income statement and annual
report variables
Administrative expenses As a percentage of total assets (%) þ þ
Default rate Non-performing loans as a percentage
of total assets (%)
- (þ) –





Earnings from investment capital and
affiliates as a percentage of total
assets (%)
– –
Risk-weighted assets Obtained from annual report þ þ
Profit before tax As a percentage of total assets (%) þ þ
External variables
Market power Herfindahl–Hirschmann Index þ –
HICP Annual rate of change in Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices
þ/- –
Interest rate 10-year sovereign bond rate þ –
GDP Annual rate of change in GDP þ/- –
Ownership structure Dummy variable that takes the value 1
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commissions as a percentage of gross margin, which grew from 2004 onward and
which could be fitted by a quadratic equation with an R2 value of 0.42. Growth was
strong between 2008, the year of the financial crisis, and 2011, the year of public bail-
outs. The results of the regression also confirmed that the credit institutions used fees
and commissions to offset the loss of revenues due to the decrease in interest margin,
thereby confirming the theory proposed in this article.
Earnings from investment capital and affiliates had a negative sign. This result was
expected because, as these earnings increase, the interest margin decreases. In this
case, the hypothesis based on the literature review was also accepted.
Administrative expenses had a positive sign, so credit institutions that invested
more in human resources had greater interest margins. We thus observed the same
results as those reported by other authors.
Credit institutions with higher rates of default ceased to receive interest on doubt-
ful loans. Accordingly, the interest margin decreased. In this case, the results were
not consistent with those reported by Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011), Kasman
et al. (2010), Lin et al. (2012) and Williams (2007), who reported that credit
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Balance sheet variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum SD Observations
Interest margin 0.016 0.016 0.031 0.001 0.005 512
Size 16.703 16.680 20.962 12.336 1.610 512
Liquidity 0.068 0.059 0.263 0.009 0.043 512
Associated companies 0.009 0.004 0.235 0.000 0.027 512
Investment in fixed income 0.106 0.096 0.421 0.000 0.072 512
Investment in variable income 0.044 0.030 0.270 0.001 0.042 512
Wholesale debt financing 0.123 0.104 0.417 0.004 0.092 512
Equity 0.061 0.059 0.167 0.059 0.024 512
Income statement and annual report variables
Fees 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.001 0.002 423
Earnings from investment capital and affiliates 0.001 0.001 0.037 0.021 0.004 423
Administrative expenses 0.013 0.012 0.027 0.006 0.004 423
NPLs 0.029 0.021 0.162 0.001 0.030 423
Risk-weighted assets 0.632 0.667 1.245 0.000 0.134 423
Earnings before tax 0.002 0.001 0.163 0.167 0.018 423
External variables
Market power 14.726 14.953 20.303 12.608 1.881 512
HICP 0.026 0.031 0.041 0.002 0.014 512
Interest rate 0.041 0.038 0.055 0.018 0.008 512
GDP 0.030 0.017 0.076 0.034 0.043 512
Source: Compiled by the authors.
Table 3. Variance inflation factor.
Model 1 VIF Model 2 VIF Model 3 VIF
Log assets 1.51 Fees and commissions 1.21 Herfindahl-Hirschmann 1.73
Liquidity 1.09 Earnings from investment
capital and affiliates
1.05 HICP 2.13
Associated companies 1.14 Administrative expenses 1.31 10-year debt 2.01
Investment in fixed income 1.65 Default rate 1.57 Nominal GDP 1.77
Investment in variable income 1.27 Risk-weighted assets 1.29 Ownership structure 2.92
Wholesale funding 1.48 Earnings before tax/assets 1.21
Equity 1.4
AR(1), Inertia 1.28 1.14 1.74
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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institutions with high rates of default should increase their margin to offset the asso-
ciated fall in revenue. However, this conclusion was not support by our analyses.
The improvement in risk-weighted assets (i.e., a reduction in) reduced the margin.
In this case, the hypothesis proposed under the theoretical framework was also corro-
borated. Credit institutions require lower interest on assets with greater solvency,
penalising lower-quality investments.
The control variable was significant and had the expected sign because credit insti-
tutions that had a higher ratio of earnings before tax to assets had a higher inter-
est margin.
Finally, we also observed a certain degree of inertia in the interest margin. This
was detected after estimating the AR(1) system regression, where the coefficient was
0.28. This value was similar to the result for the regression of balance sheet variables.
4.3. External variables
An increase in market power (Herfindahl–Hirschmann index) reduced the interest
margin. This result contradicts those reported by other authors cited in the litera-
ture review. However, this finding is reasonable given the nature of the process of
mergers and acquisitions in the Spanish financial system. Credit institutions have
grown through these mergers, but this growth has taken place in other regional
markets where they did not previously operate. Therefore, by increasing their size,
these credit institutions have achieved economies of scale and have reduced their
interest margins. However, this growth does not indicate a greater market share
(greater market concentration) in the home market. Therefore, the interest margin
did not increase, which was the outcome predicted by the authors cited in the lit-
erature review.
By increasing inflation, the interest margin decreased. This finding thereby implies
that the effect is counter-cyclical. This finding is consistent with those of Claeys and
Vennet (2008) and Kasman et al. (2010).
Figure 2. Fees and commissions as a percentage of assets and gross margin.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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The final variable studied in this group was ownership structure (savings banks vs.
commercial banks). Private banks had a greater interest margin than public sav-
ings banks.
4.4. Annual effects
The crisis of 2007 to 2009 and the injection of public capital in 2011 and 2012 caused
an increase in the margin. Chen and Lin (2016) theory of bank bailouts could not be
corroborated for the case of Spain.
5. Implications
The new Basil III Accord, which stipulates both short- and long-term minimum
liquidity requirements, is deeply detrimental to the earnings of credit institutions
because these requirements cause the interest margin to fall and thereby reduce prof-
its and solvency. According to Chen, Tsai, and Jou (2016), however, greater capital
banking requirements lead to a higher interest margin. Accordingly, this increase
would have a considerable negative effect on the interest margin and profitability.
Investment in associated companies (investment banking) diversifies risk. If funds
are well invested and the associated companies perform well, this can offset or out-
weigh the attendant reduction in the margin, especially given today’s small margins.
However, if the decision to take control is based on political reasons, as has occurred
with Spanish savings banks in recent years (Climent-Serrano & Pavıa, 2014a), these
investments will impair profitability. This seems to be the point of view of the
European Commission because it plans to limit investments made by European credit
institutions using their own funds. This measure has already been applied to institu-
tions that have requested public funding from the EU.
The increase in turnover by attracting funding from securitization or mortgage
bonds in the wholesale markets has led to an increase in the interest margin. This
situation, which, a priori, would seem positive for credit institutions, must be fur-
ther explained. The increase in financing was largely due to issuing mortgages
under weak conditions in terms of repayment guarantees, leading to over lending.
This increase in credit contributed to the housing bubble, which subsequently
caused the rate of default to rise to over 13% (Climent-Serrano & Pavıa, 2014b).
Furthermore, subprime mortgages increased uncertainty from 2008 onward, the
wholesale markets virtually disappeared, and highly leveraged institutions encoun-
tered major liquidity problems. These problems would have been fatal without the
intervention of the European Central Bank (E.C.B.), which injected huge amounts
of liquidity to European banks.
Earnings from fees and commissions provide the main source of income used by
credit institutions to offset the decrease in the interest margin. Customers are
renowned for their reluctance to pay bank fees and commissions. However, banks
are forced to apply these fees and commissions because numerous long-term loans
are indexed to the Euribor, which, as of July 2016, remained negative, meaning that
the interest in most cases is less than 1%.
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Credit institutions with high labour costs have a high interest margin. This may be
for two reasons. First, credit institutions that incur high operating costs transfer these
costs to customers through a high interest margin. Second, credit institutions with
high labour costs may offer customers a higher quality product at a lower risk to
lenders. This is reflected by a higher margin because, as noted by Alhassan and Asare
(2016), credit institutions that invest in intellectual capital can achieve a competitive
advantage. This would be an interesting topic for further research, especially given
the cost reduction policies adopted by Spanish credit institutions.
One variable that has received little attention is risk-weighted assets. This variable is
nonetheless important because it indicates the risk taken by credit institutions. A lower
value means less risk and therefore a lower margin. Furthermore, since the first version
of the Basil Accords, this has been one of the key variables to calculate capital needs.
However, the Basil Accords allow the calculation of risk-weighted assets through the
internal ratings-based approach (I.R.B.). This benefits credit institutions because, in
addition to calculating this value, they can study their customers and obtain informa-
tion about their solvency. This information, in addition to being used internally, can be
sold, providing additional revenue. In this case, it would also be of interest to study the
effect of risk-weighted assets on total income. In other words, it would be of interest to
study whether a higher margin with poor-quality assets and high risk is more profitable
than a lower margin with high-quality assets and low risk.
The current restructuring of the Spanish financial system, backed by the Spanish
authorities, has substantially reduced the number of credit institutions (Climent-Serrano
& Pavıa, 2015). Accordingly, the market power of the remaining credit institutions
seems to have increased. However, this market growth has not actually resulted in a
greater margin, as was expected; instead, the opposite has occurred. A possible cause is
the nature of the mergers and acquisitions that have taken place during this process
because, for the first time, these mergers and acquisitions have mostly been across
regions (Climent-Serrano, 2013). Therefore, the credit institutions have grown in size
and market power without any increase in the regional market share. Unlike Cai et al.
(2016), we did not study the market share by province. The same situation that has
arisen in Spain following mergers between credit institutions operating in different
regions could just as easily apply to the process of mergers between credit institutions
from different EU countries. This policy could potentially be implemented under the
auspices of the ECB. The outcome would be larger credit institutions without increasing
monopolistic power. Therefore, economies of scale could reduce the interest margin.
Savings banks have disappeared from the Spanish financial market. One of the
results that partially justifies this situation is that savings banks had lower interest
margins than those of commercial banks.
Just as H€annik€ainen (2015) reported, we have confirmed that the interest margin
has predictive power, predicting monetary policy and economic cycles.
6. Conclusion
In two decades, the interest margin has decreased from 80% of credit institutions’
total earnings to less than 50% of revenue. Accordingly, the determinants of the
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interest margin must also have changed. It is therefore important to study this issue.
We drew upon and enhanced the method described by Ho and Saunders (1981).
Four different regression models were estimated to separately study balance sheet var-
iables, income statement and annual report variables, external variables, and the
annual effects on the interest margin.
The common denominator in all of these models was a certain inertia of the
dependent variable. We therefore estimated three of the models using the AR(1) system
and one of the models using the G.M.M. This variable was significant, with an average
coefficient of 0.30. We also considered seven variables that had never been studied.
The results with respect to the balance sheet variables indicate that an increase in
liquidity, investment in associated companies, investment in fixed income and invest-
ment in variable income all reduce the interest margin. In contrast, an increase in
equity and wholesale funding should increase the interest margin. With respect to the
income statement and annual report variables, the results imply that a decrease in the
interest margin is offset by an increase in fees and commissions and in earnings from
fixed income, variable income and associated companies. The increase in the rate of
default reduces the margin, whereas a decrease in the risk-weighted assets (i.e., an
increase in asset quality) also reduces the margin.
In terms of the external variables, the increase in the market power of interest
rates, the G.D.P. and the H.I.C.P. reduce the interest margin. Finally, the results show
that the period of crisis in 2008 and the injection of public funds in 2001 and 2002
caused an increase in the interest margin.
Finally, the results suggest that a possible cause leading to the disappearance of
savings banks is a lower interest margin than that of commercial banks.
There are limitations to enhanced research given that the evolution of the economy
is a continuous process. This is why new factors and actors, such as new technology
companies like Google, or large companies like Amazon are entering the market. New
actors are also increasing competition with less regulation, with companies like
TransferWise at much more competitive prices. Even factors that cannot be observed,
due to their recent implementation – as the taxes for bailouts (Kogler, 2019). However,
the results obtained will provide a great help to the current theoretical framework.
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